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VIATICAL SETTLEMENTS AND THE ELDERLY:
POTENTIAL ADVANTAGES AND
HIDDEN DANGERS
Anna D. Halechko*
INTRODUCTION
A viatical settlement is a process by which a terminally ill indi-
vidual can sell his or her life insurance policy to an investor who
pays the insured a discounted face value and then collects the pol-
icy benefit upon the insured’s death.1  The term “viatical” comes
from the Latin word “viaticum,” which in Roman times was a purse
containing money and provisions for a journey.2  Later, the term
was used to refer to the communion given to the dying in the last
rites of the Catholic Church.3  In its purest form, therefore, a viati-
cal settlement is a way in which dying people can acquire access to
resources to benefit the last days of their lives.  This noble-sound-
ing purpose, however, has been complicated and often corrupted
by the actions of overzealous entrepreneurs who are willing to take
advantage of the most vulnerable in society in order to increase
profits.  Viatical settlements are often marketed to the chronically
and terminally ill.  The elderly in particular have been targeted as a
major market for this financial vehicle.4  This article will first ex-
plore the basic workings of a viatical settlement, along with its ben-
efits and disadvantages for elderly consumers.  The second section
reviews the problem of fraud, which has permeated the viatical
market, together with the developing case law related to the viatical
industry.  The concluding section addresses the potential for regu-
lation of the industry.
* Candidate for J.D., Duquesne University School of Law, May 2004.  The author
is first in her class and has received the Alcoa Foundation Scholarship, Leona R.
Robinson Memorial Scholarship, and the Gerald K. Gibson Award for outstanding
achievement in the study of bankruptcy law.  She also holds a Ph.D. in clinical psy-
chology from the University of Pittsburgh, where she currently is assistant chairperson
of the department of psychology.  She is the third-place winner of the ABA/FJC Law
and Aging Student Essay Competition, Sid Kess Award.
1 Liza M. Ray, The Viatical Settlement Industry: Betting on People’s Lives Is Certainly No
“Exacta,” 17 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 321, 322 (2000).
2 Id. at 325.
3 Id.
4 See generally Lawrence A. Frolik, Insurance Fraud on the Elderly, 37 TRIAL 48 (2001).
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I. THE MECHANISM OF A VIATICAL SETTLEMENT
The key parties in a viatical settlement are the insured, known
as the viator, the insurance company that issued the policy, and the
viatical settlement provider who purchases the policy from the in-
sured.  In some cases, the viatical settlement provider is a broker
who merely matches the viator with an investor, the person who
will actually purchase the policy.  As the investment market in viati-
cals has grown, the roles of provider and broker have become
blurred:  many providers purchase policies only to resell them to
investors or merge them into large investment pools which are
then sold in shares.  These mutual funds of viaticated policies or so-
called “death futures” have become both popular investment vehi-
cles and the subject of numerous fraudulent schemes.5
The first step in the viatication process is a meeting between
the terminally ill insured and the viatical provider.  The provider
typically requires access to the insured’s medical records and often
contacts the insured’s physician directly.  In addition, the provider
reviews the insurance policy to determine that change of benefici-
ary is permitted and that no unusual restrictions apply.  The pro-
vider also ascertains that the insurer is a reputable company with a
strong record of paying beneficiaries promptly.  Essentially, the
provider investigates the factors that determine the degree of risk
in the investment.  From this determination, the provider will cal-
culate an offer price for the viator.
If the viator accepts the offer, the policy is sold to the provider
who then lists himself or herself as the beneficiary on the policy.
The provider is now responsible for paying any remaining premi-
ums.  Typically, the provider will stay in touch with the viator, and
upon the viator’s death, will collect the entire face value of the
policy.  The provider’s profit is the face value minus the amount
paid to the viator, minus any premiums or other administrative
expenses.
In the simplified version of the process described above, the
viator and provider work with one another directly.  In reality,
there are likely to be many intervening parties involved in the
transaction.  As noted, a broker often makes the initial contact with
5 See generally Miriam R. Albert, The Future of Death Futures: Why Viatical Settlements
Must be Classified as Securities, 19 PACE L. REV. 345 (1999); Andrew Spurrier, Commen-
tary, The Death of Death Futures?: The Effects of the Health Insurance Portability and Account-
ability Act of 1996 on the Insurance and Viatical Settlement Industries, 4 CONN. INS. L.J. 807
n.1 (1998) (explaining that the term “death futures” was originally used in this con-
text in a SPY magazine article in 1993).
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the viator, who may not even know the true purchaser of his or her
policy.  Often, the funds are not passed directly, but are held in
escrow until the beneficiary change is finalized.  Afterward, there
may be others involved in administering the policy: paying the pre-
miums, checking on the viator, obtaining a death certificate, and
applying to the insurer for the death benefit.
The complexity of this process is significant, and poses some
dangers to viators who initially may not realize they are dealing
with a conglomerate of businesses rather than with an individual.
The major power imbalance between the viators and the viatical
settlement providers and their associates creates a strong potential
for abuse.6  Because of illness, a viator may not have the energy or
motivation to “comparison shop” for the best payment.7  A viator
may not realize that he or she is giving up all rights to the policy for
himself or herself and for his or her former beneficiaries.  Time is
precious — what should a viator do if the payment is delayed or
some other problem arises and the viator is unable to contact the
viatical provider?  Finally, there is the major issue of confidentiality,
because each additional party to a viatical transaction may gain ac-
cess to the viator’s medical records and may even intrude upon the
viator’s privacy directly by phoning or visiting the viator at home
(ostensibly to see how the viator is doing; actually to determine if
he or she is still alive).
II. GROWTH OF THE VIATICAL INDUSTRY
The viatical industry was born in the 1980s in response to the
Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) crisis.8  In the
early years of the pandemic, AIDS was a rapidly fatal disease whose
victims usually died within a few months of their diagnosis.   Many
AIDS sufferers were single gay men who had little need to leave
6 Joy D. Kosiewicz, Death for Sale: A Call to Regulate the Viatical Settlement Industry, 48
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 701, 703 (1998) (“On one side of the transaction is a large
company with numerous resources, lots of money, and enormous bargaining power.
On the other side is a terminally or chronically ill patient or elderly person with little
money, big expenses, and few resources.”).
7 The viatical provider may essentially have a monopoly in a local area:
[e]ach geographical area has a small number of firms providing a ser-
vice with no close substitutes, some barriers to entry, and the potential
for excess profits. . . . Thus, viatical settlement companies may have
functional monopolies which allow them, in effect, to hold potential
viators who may be too sick to travel, or even to investigate other alter-
natives, essentially as geographic hostages.
Miriam R. Albert, Article, Selling Death Short: The Regulatory and Policy Implications of
Viatical Settlements, 61 ALB. L. REV. 1013, 1023 (1998).
8 Kosiewicz, supra note 6, at 704.
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their insurance proceeds to beneficiaries, but were in great need of
an infusion of income to pay for their care after they became debil-
itated by the disease.  Their life expectancies were short and rela-
tively predictable; thus, they were attractive subjects for viatication.
The industry grew dramatically from the approximate sale of
$500 million in policy values in 1989 to well over $1 billion by
2000.9  But along the way, the essential characteristics of the viator
population changed.  Advances in medicine made AIDS a treat-
able, if not curable, disease.  Instead of dying within a few months,
AIDS patients’ lives could be continued for years on a regimen of
antiviral “cocktails.”  They no longer were the sure bet for rapid
demise that had been so attractive to the early viatical settlement
companies.  Nevertheless, the viatical providers found new markets
for their product in the growing population of chronically ill and
elderly persons.10  People suffering from cancer, Alzheimer’s dis-
ease, and other progressive illnesses, as well as frail elderly men
and women in need of funds for assisted living, found that viatical
settlements could provide a new source of income.11  In addition, a
rather surprising new viator population emerged: affluent older
people who had purchased life insurance when their children were
young but no longer felt the need to provide for them and wanted
to enjoy at least a partial return from their policies.12
A major impetus to the growth of the viatical settlement indus-
try occurred with the passage of the Health Insurance Portability
and Accountability Act (HIPAA) in 1996.13  Under the IRS regula-
tions in existence prior to HIPAA, payments received under a life
insurance contract by reason of the death of the insured were ex-
cluded only from the taxable income of the beneficiary.14  In con-
trast, payment received by the insured for the sale of his policy was
considered ordinary taxable income.  HIPAA expanded the exclu-
sion to benefit the terminally ill by providing that viatical settle-
ments and accelerated death benefits would not be taxable.15  The
Act also provided a relatively flexible definition of “terminal ill-
9 Albert, supra note 5, at 353.
10 Id. at 357.
11 Id.
12 Joseph B. Treaster, Death Benefits, Now for the Living, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 1998,
§ 3, at 1.
13 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, 26 U.S.C. § 101(g)
(1997); I.R.C. § 101(g) (1997).
14 Spurrier, supra note 5, at 813.
15 Id. at 814.  In contrast to viatical settlements, accelerated death benefits are paid
by the insurance company to the insured under the terms of some policies.  Typically,
these benefits represent a lower percent of the policy face value than a viatical pay-
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ness” as an illness or physical condition of an individual such that
death can “reasonably be expected” to occur within 24 months, as
estimated by the individual’s physician.16
In addition, HIPAA extended tax benefits to the chronically as
well as the terminally ill, if the proceeds of the viatical settlement
were used to pay for long-term care services.17  A chronically ill in-
dividual was defined as someone who is unable to perform at least
two activities of daily living without assistance for a period of at
least 90 days or who requires substantial supervision to protect his
health and safety because of severe cognitive impairment.18  By the
late 1990s, viatical marketers focused heavily on these new target
populations of terminally and chronically ill elderly, and AIDS suf-
ferers comprised only a small percentage of viators.
III. FRAUD IN THE VIATICAL INDUSTRY
The elderly are particularly susceptible to becoming victims of
fraudulent investment schemes.19  Diminished acuity in sight and
hearing causes difficulty in reading the fine print of contracts or
listening to an oral explanation of risks and benefits.20  Poor health
and lack of energy may prevent an elderly individual from con-
ducting a thorough investigation before signing an agreement.21
Cognitive deficits such as mild dementia or simple short-term
memory loss may interfere with understanding the transaction.22
Even social isolation can contribute to an elderly person’s vulnera-
bility when approached by a seemingly friendly salesperson.23
The prospect of selling a policy to a viatical settlement com-
pany may seem like an easy method to acquire extra funds for the
chronically ill elderly person living on a fixed income.  However,
the extra money may actually interfere with the person’s eligibility
for current sources of income, such as means-tested benefits like
ment, but the remaining value of the policy is paid to the beneficiary after the in-
sured’s death.  Ownership of the policy remains with the insured. Id. at 809-10.
16 Id. at 816.
17 Id. at 818.
18 Id.; see also Gary J. Gasper, Viatical Settlements – Cashing Out Life Insurance, 11
PROB. & PROP. 20, 21-22 (1997) (explaining HIPAA changes).
19 Lawrence A. Frolik, Ass’n of Trial Lawyers of Am. Annual Convention, Why the
Elderly Are Vulnerable to Insurance Fraud, 1 ANN. 2001 ATLA-CLE 597 (2001).
20 Id.
21 Id.
22 Id.
23 Id.; see also Frolik, supra note 4.
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Medicaid and SSI.24  Nursing homes may even encourage elderly
residents to become viators because the resulting self-payment
from the resident would be higher than the home’s reimburse-
ment from Medicaid.25  At the other end of the economic spec-
trum, an affluent elderly person who has funds to invest may be
drawn by promises of high returns and low risk, or may even view
the viatical market as a humanitarian endeavor.26
Unfortunately, the viatical industry has been plagued with
many forms of fraud and unethical practices, as will be discussed.
Because of the complex relationships among the viator, the insur-
ance company, the viatical provider, the investor, and various
agents and brokers, the possibilities for deception are numerous.
In general, fraudulent practices in the viatical industry can be clas-
sified into four major categories: (1) insurance agents defrauding
insurance companies by hiding the viators’ health status; (2) via-
tors defrauding insurance companies on their own; (3) viators de-
frauding viatical settlement companies; and (4) viatical settlement
companies defrauding viators and investors alike.27
Davis v. Texas provides an example of the first type of fraud.28
There, an insurance agent worked with a viatical provider to in-
duce AIDS viators to apply for additional policies; soon after they
sold their existing policies to the viatical company, the AIDS suffer-
ers were contacted by the insurance agent who assisted them in
applying for several new policies.29  The agent filled out the insur-
ance applications with false information about the applicants’
health status, a process known as “clean sheeting.”30  The viators
were reimbursed for the policy premiums and were paid directly
for each new policy issued.31
The second type of fraud is illustrated in Amex Life Assurance v.
Superior Court of Los Angeles County.32  There, an applicant for an
insurance policy, who knew he was HIV positive, sent an imposter
to take the required physical exam.33  Later, the insured individual
sold the policy to a viatical company.  After the viator’s death and
24 Gregory C. Larson & Melissa Hauer, Planning for Nursing Home Care in North
Dakota, 74 N.D. L. REV. 191, 198 (1998).
25 Albert, supra note 5, at 364.
26 See Treaster, supra note 12.
27 Albert, supra note 5, at 368.
28 68 S.W.3d 273 (Tex. Ct. App. 2002).
29 Id. at 278.
30 Id. at 279.
31 Id.
32 930 P.2d 1264 (Cal. 1997).
33 Id. at 1266.
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the discovery of the deception, the insurance company attempted
to withhold payment to the viatical provider.34  The court ruled
against the insurer, however, because the two-year contestability pe-
riod on the policy had expired.
The third type of fraud occurs if a viator presents his or her
health status worse than it actually is, deceiving the viatical provider
into offering a higher payment for his or her policy.35  For exam-
ple, an AIDS patient could postpone starting a course of treatment
until after the viatical settlement was complete.36  If he then under-
went a successful course of treatment that had the effect of pro-
longing his life, the profit margin of the viatical provider would be
reduced.37
Another potentially fraudulent activity perpetrated by a viator
could occur if an insured person sold his or her policy to more
than one viatical company, although this type of fraud has become
less likely as viatical providers have become increasingly sophisti-
cated and require direct confirmation from the insurance com-
pany of any policy changes undertaken by the insured.38
Nevertheless, a viator may attempt to sell a policy over which he or
she has no legal control.  In Gander v. Gander, a father was required
as part of a divorce settlement to maintain a life insurance policy
on himself as the insured and his ex-wife as the beneficiary, with all
proceeds of the policy to be held in trust for the couple’s two chil-
dren.  However, he sold the policy to a viatical settlement com-
pany.39  The children sued the viatical provider, and the court
found that they were the legal beneficiaries of the policy.40  Al-
though the viatical company argued unsuccessfully that it was a
bona fide purchaser of the policy, the court held that the company
had notice of the conflicting claim.41
The most prevalent form of fraud is the final type, in which
unscrupulous providers and brokers deceive unsuspecting viators
and investors.  The viator is defrauded by receiving payment far
below the present value of his or her policy.  The National Associa-
tion of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) has issued guidelines for
payments based on the life expectancy of the insured; however,
34 Id.
35 Albert, supra note 5, at 377.
36 Id.
37 Id.
38 Id. at 378.
39 250 F.3d 606 (8th Cir. 2001).
40 Id. at 613.
41 Id.
142 NEW YORK CITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 6:135
these have not been adopted in all states.42
Many schemes have been perpetrated by viatical providers to
solicit investors fraudulently, often from among the vulnerable eld-
erly population.  In SEC v. Tyler,43 the defendant was accused of
enticing more than 480 elderly investors into purchasing viatical
shares with false guarantees of liquidity, high interest rates, and
fixed maturity dates.  In reality, viaticals are generally not liquid, do
not have fixed maturity dates (because the date of the insured’s
death is uncertain), and their rate of return is a variable dependent
upon how long the insured survives after his or her policy is sold.44
Tyler lured investors through an elaborate campaign of newspaper
ads, investment seminars, telemarketing calls, and mass mailings.45
In a Pennsylvania case, Srein v. Frankford Trust Co., a broker
sold the same viatical policy to two investors.46  Although both in-
vestors had accounts with Frankford Trust, the viaticals were not
registered investments and no one at the trust company noticed
the duplication.47  After several years, Srein began to investigate
why his viatical investments were not paying off and discovered that
the policy benefits had been paid out to the other investor.48  At
the district court level, his suit against the trust company was unsuc-
cessful because of his contributory negligence in failing to monitor
his investments more closely.49
On appeal, the decision was reversed and the case remanded
for a new trial.50  The appeals court recognized that the trust com-
pany had a fiduciary duty to the plaintiff, established when Frank-
ford solicited Srein’s business and charged him fees for trust
management.51  In failing to establish an efficient tracking system
which would have identified the duplications, Frankford neglected
to notice that the proceeds of Srein’s investments were being paid
into another account.52   However, even the appeals court chal-
42 VIATICAL SETTLEMENTS MODEL REGULATION (National Association of Insurance
Commissioners, Draft 2003), at http://www.naic.org/models_papers/models/docs/
viatic14.pdf (on file with the New York City Law Review).
43 No. 3:02-CV-0282-P, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2952 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 21, 2002).
44 Id.
45 Id. at *3-4.
46 323 F.3d 214, 219 (3d Cir. 2003).  Srein initially sued the broker and won a
judgment of $2 million, but by then the broker was insolvent and the judgment could
not be collected. Id.
47 Id. at 217.
48 Id. at 219.
49 Id.
50 Id. at 225.
51 Id. at 222-23.
52 Id. at 219.
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lenged Srein for not monitoring his investments more closely, and
reversed the lower court on the ground that it had failed to prop-
erly instruct the jury on the Pennsylvania Comparative Negligence
Act.53  Thus, it seems that “let the buyer beware” continues to be
the appropriate motto for investors in viatical plans.
IV. VIATICAL SETTLEMENTS AND SECURITIES REGULATION
Courts have struggled with the question of whether or not viat-
ical arrangements should be considered “securities” and thus sub-
ject to the control of the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC).  If so, the purveyors of these arrangements would be re-
quired to reveal certain information regarding risks and perform-
ance of investments, so that potential buyers would have the
capability of making informed decisions.  Although the SEC has
monitored the viatical industry closely, it has not been successful in
obtaining a clear ruling at the federal level that viaticals must meet
the legal requirements of securities.
The highest federal court to consider the question has been
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit in Securities and Exchange Commission v. Life Partners, Inc.54
Life Partners marketed fractions of viatical contracts which allowed
small investors to pay as little as a few hundred dollars for a share
of a policy.55  Using financial planners as its agents, Life Partners
grew to dominate the market, which attracted the attention of the
SEC.56  Although Life Partners modified its business practices sev-
eral times, it essentially operated by identifying potential viators,
evaluating their medical records to determine degree of risk,
purchasing the insurance policies and naming itself as the benefici-
ary, and then reselling fractions or shares of the policies to inves-
tors.57  When it came under scrutiny of the SEC, Life Partners
changed its practice to either list the investors or an escrow agent
as the policy owner instead of itself.58  Under either plan, Life Part-
ners made its profit through fees charged to the investors before
the proceeds of the policies were paid out.59
The district court agreed with the SEC and held that Life Part-
53 Id. at 224.
54 87 F.3d 536 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
55 Id. at 539.
56 Id.
57 The medical risk evaluations of policy holders were conducted by a physician
who was a part owner of Life Partners. Id.
58 Id. at 540.
59 Id.
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ners was selling securities without a license.  However, the court of
appeals reversed, after applying the three-pronged test used by the
U.S. Supreme Court in Securities and Exchange Commission v. W.J.
Howey Co.60  Under this test, an investment contract is deemed to
be a security if the investors (1) expect profits from (2) a common
enterprise that (3) depends on the efforts of others.61  Clearly, the
investors in the Life Partners viaticals expected profits, clearly
theirs was a common enterprise in that their funds were pooled to
buy the policies, and they shared any profits or losses after the pol-
icy benefits were paid out.  However, the court ruled that the third
prong of the test was not met, because Life Partners performed no
essential entrepreneurial services after the purchase of the con-
tracts.62  The court reasoned that the profitability of the investment
was directly determined by how long a viator lived, not by any ac-
tions of Life Partners itself.  The court specifically discounted the
pre-purchase activities performed by Life Partners (e.g., identifica-
tion of potential viators, rating of medical risk, negotiation of con-
tract price) as not meeting the intent of the third prong.63  Thus,
the court established a bright-line test in that an investment con-
tract would only be considered a security if, post-purchase, the
seller continued to perform some substantial activity that affected
the profitability of the arrangement.
The Life Partners decision has been widely cited and frequently
criticized.  Several state appellate courts have considered similar vi-
atical investment plans and ruled that they are securities for the
purpose of state securities regulation.  In Joseph v. Viatica Manage-
ment, L.L.C., the Colorado Court of Appeals ruled that the “units”
of investment in a viatical fund met the state definition of a secur-
ity.64  Viatica Management sold investment units for a minimum
price of $25,000.65  The plan was to pool these monies into multi-
million-dollar funds which would then purchase large numbers of
viaticated policies.66  When the return on investment proved to be
smaller than promised, a disgruntled investor complained to the
state securities commission.67  Here, the court applied the Howey
test and found that all three prongs were met.  In its analysis of the
60 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
61 Life Partners, 87 F.3d at 540.
62 Id. at 546.
63 Id.
64 55 P.3d 264, 267 (Colo. Ct. App. 2002).
65 Id. at 265.
66 Id.
67 Id.  When advances in medical treatment led to longer lives for AIDS patients,
the returns on their viatical settlements did not come as quickly as expected. Id.
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critical third prong, the court distinguished the case from Life Part-
ners; it also noted that the reasoning followed in Life Partners was
unpersuasive.68  Essentially, the investors in Life Partners were sold
fractional shares in specific viatical policies; in contrast, Viatica
Management sold shares in a fund which then purchased multiple
policies.69  The identification of these policies and the negotiation
of the viatical settlements were all done post-investment, or at least
were not identified to the potential investors at the time they were
making their decision to buy into the fund.70  In this way, the
bright-line test established in Life Partners was met because profits
were determined by activities carried on post-purchase by the plan
sponsors.71
In Siporin v. Carrington, an Arizona case, the “bright-line” dis-
tinction between pre- and post-purchase activities was challenged.72
Carrington had solicited investors with brochures promising
double-digit returns; he also marketed to potential viators through
local health service organizations.73  Carrington did his homework
by investigating a number of factors that could affect the outcome
of the viatical arrangement.74  After being given access to medical
records, he would contact the viator’s physician for an estimation
of life expectancy.75  He also investigated the rating of the life in-
surance company and determined whether the policy allowed as-
signment of beneficiaries.76  Finally, Carrington required that
former beneficiaries formally waive their rights under the policy.77
The court concluded that the profitability of the viatical invest-
ment was directly related to Carrington’s pre-purchase activities.78
The success or failure of the investment was largely determined by
his skill in selecting appropriate viators who had policies with
strong insurers and whose policies contained the particular clauses
that permitted viatication.79  In applying the Howey test and con-
68 Id. at 267.
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 Id.
72 23 P.3d 92 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2001).
73 Id. at 93.  “In the ‘Win/Win Investing’ brochure, Carrington suggests returns of
from 10% to 11% for policies in which the viator had a projected life expectancy of
up to 12 months, to as high as 68% to 70% for policies in which the viator’s projected
life expectancy was up to 48 months.” Id. at 94.
74 Id. at 93-94.
75 Id.
76 Id. at 94.
77 Id.
78 Id. at 98.
79 Id. at 99.
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cluding that all three prongs were met, the Siporin court noted that
it was taking a position contrary to that of the Life Partners court.80
Although state courts typically follow the rulings of federal courts,
here, the court felt that the rigidity of the Life Partners bright-line
test undermined the purpose of the securities regulation statutes.81
In concluding that Carrington’s plan constituted the sale of securi-
ties, the court stated that “[w]hat truly determines viatical settle-
ment profitability is the realization, over time, of an outcome
predicted by the seller through its analysis of the viator’s life expec-
tancy, the soundness of the insurer, the actions needed to keep the
policy in effect for the original face amount, and the insurer’s un-
conditional liability under the policy’s terms.”82  Whether the activ-
ities occur before or after the investment is immaterial to the
determination that the investment is a form of security
transaction.83
The rigidity of the Life Partners approach has also been re-
jected by other federal courts.  In SEC v. Tyler, the U.S. District
Court for the Northern District of Texas reasoned that because the
defendant performed a post-purchase service when he bought viati-
cals in his own name and sold fractions to investors, he created a
form of liquidity which heightened the value of the investment.84
If investors wanted to sell their shares, Tyler would either sell them
to others or buy them back himself, thus creating an artificial sec-
ondary market.85  Even though the investors may not have been
aware of his actions, the court felt that they relied on his descrip-
tion of the investments as being liquid.86  This was found to be suf-
ficient to pass the third prong of the Howey test and supported the
court’s finding that the viatical investment met the definition of a
security.87
Despite the group of decisions contrary to Life Partners, state
courts continue to adopt various positions on whether viatical set-
tlements should be treated as securities.  In a recent Ohio decision,
Glick v. Sokol, the court reverted to the position that “the only varia-
ble that can impact the profitability of the viatical settlements at
80 Id. at 98.
81 Id.
82 Id. at 99.
83 Id.
84 No. 3:02-CV-0282-P, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2952, at *18-19 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 21,
2002).
85 Id. at *6.
86 Id.
87 Id. at *19.
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issue is the timing of the death of the insured.”88   Although this
court did not cite the Life Partners decision, its reasoning was essen-
tially the same: the value of the investment is determined by the
timing of the insured’s death, not by any actions taken by the viati-
cal settlement provider or broker.89
While courts remain divided on the issue of viaticals as securi-
ties, some states have taken legislative or regulatory action to re-
solve the problem.  For example, the Pennsylvania Securities
Commission (PSC) has issued a notice that viatical settlements are
“investment contracts” and as such are considered to be securities
and subject to the regulation of the PSC.90  Although it noted the
Life Partners decision to the contrary, the PSC pointed out that a
federal case is not automatically binding on state courts.91  Under
PSC regulations, sellers of viatical arrangements are required to be
registered in the state as brokers and must disclose all information
material to the transaction.92
V. MODEL ACT AND REGULATION
The National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC)
has developed a Viatical Settlements Model Act93 and Viatical Set-
tlements Model Regulation94 to guide states in their supervision of
the viatical industry.  Originally issued in 1993 and 1994 respec-
tively, both models have been extensively amended to reflect the
changing characteristics of the industry.
The Model Act provides that a viatical settlement provider or
broker must be licensed in the state in which the viator resides, and
it gives the state authority to approve the formats of viatical con-
tracts.95  The content of disclosure statements to the viator is speci-
fied in detail and includes warnings that the proceeds of the
settlement may be subject to creditor claims and may adversely af-
88 777 N.E.2d 315, 316 (Ohio Ct. App. 2002).
89 Id. at 319.  The court reached its decision in spite of its recognition that, by
statute, Ohio declared all viatical arrangements to be securities subject to registration
under the Ohio Securities Law, effective Oct. 5, 2001.  The Glick investment was
made in 1998. Id. at 316.
90 Securities Commission, Compliance Notice to the Viatical Industry, 30 PA. BULL.
6670 (Dec. 23, 2000) LEXIS.
91 Id.
92 Id.
93 VIATICAL SETTLEMENTS MODEL ACT (National Association of Insurance Commis-
sioners 2001), at http://advancedsettlements.net/newsite/compliance/naic.pdf (on
file with the New York City Law Review).
94 VIATICAL SETTLEMENTS MODEL REGULATION, supra note 42.
95 VIATICAL SETTLEMENTS MODEL ACT, supra note 93, at §§ 3-5.
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fect the viator’s eligibility for Medicaid and other government ben-
efits.96  The viator is given a 15-day period within which he or she
may rescind the settlement contract after receipt of the payment.97
If the viator dies within this period, the contract is deemed to be
rescinded, the viatical payment must be refunded, and the policy
payment is made to the original beneficiary.98  Viators are also
protected from excess intrusiveness by the providers: the Model
Act limits visits to once a month if the insured has a life expectancy
of less than one year and once in three months if the life expec-
tancy is longer than a year.99
The Model Act also includes an extensive section regarding
guidelines for advertising of viatical settlements and viatical invest-
ment plans.100  Certain terms are assumed to be false or misleading
on their face and are prohibited; these terms include “guaran-
teed,” “no risk,” “high yield,” and “quick profit.”101  The viatical set-
tlement provider or broker is also required to develop an
“antifraud plan,” which must be submitted to the state insurance
commissioner.102  The plan must provide for the detection and
elimination of fraudulent activities by any personnel involved in
the viatical settlement process.103
The NAIC Model Regulation includes sample disclosure state-
ments and consumer warnings.104  It also provides a set of stan-
dards for determining reasonable viatical payments.  These
standards are based on the life expectancy of the insured and
range from 50% of policy face value when the insured’s life expec-
tancy is greater than 24 months to 80% when life expectancy is less
than six months.105  Among its other protections, the Model Regu-
lation provides the interesting stipulation that “[a] viatical settle-
ment provider shall not knowingly solicit investors who have
treated . . . the illness of the insured whose coverage would be the
subject of the investment.”106
Thirty-seven states have adopted some version of the NAIC
models.  On July 4, 2002, Pennsylvania passed its Viatical Settle-
96 Id. at § 8.
97 Id.
98 Id. at § 9.
99 Id.
100 Id. at § 11.
101 Id.
102 Id. at § 12.
103 Id.
104 VIATICAL SETTLEMENTS MODEL REGULATION, supra note 42, at App. A.
105 Id. at § 5.
106 Id. at § 7.
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ments Act, which became effective in January 2003.107  Although
largely drawn from the NAIC Model Act, the Pennsylvania statute
omitted the large section in the Model Act that provided guide-
lines for advertising viatical settlements and investments.  The legis-
lators may have felt that the issue would be adequately covered by
the state securities commission in its oversight of viatical invest-
ment plans.  However, clear legislative direction in this area would
have been advisable, as misleading advertising has been at the
center of much of the fraudulent activity in the viatical industry.
Perhaps the forthcoming regulations will address this problem.
CONCLUSION
An elderly person who is considering involvement in a viatical
settlement, either as a viator or an investor, must make a cautious
appraisal of the benefits and risks.  For the viator, the cash received
from a previously hidden asset may help pay for medication, as-
sisted living or one last vacation.  But the viator must be careful
that he or she is receiving reasonable value for the policy and that
the viatical “deal” is better than alternatives of tapping an acceler-
ated death benefit or simply borrowing against the policy.  Individ-
ual circumstances also must be considered, such as the desire to
provide for beneficiaries, as well as the potential impact on Medi-
caid eligibility.
For the potential investor, the key word is caution.  Viatical
plans are not low risk and a positive rate of return is not guaran-
teed.  What looks like a simple way to make money, and maybe
even help a fellow human being in need, is really a complex finan-
cial transaction designed to enrich many parties before the individ-
ual investor gets his or her return.  Only those wealthy enough to
afford speculating with their funds should even consider viatical
investments.
In spite of these limitations, the viatical industry continues to
grow and is apparently fulfilling multiple needs among the termi-
nally and chronically ill.  It is hoped that the heightened surveil-
lance from state regulatory agencies will reduce the more flagrant
abuses and allow the ill and the elderly to benefit from the positive
features of viatical arrangements.
107 Viatical Settlements Act, 40 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 626.1-17 (2003).

